Medical Malpractice Claim--Plaintiff\u27s Privacy Is Protected by Cole, Morry S.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 62 
Issue 1 Winter 1997 Article 13 
Winter 1997 
Medical Malpractice Claim--Plaintiff's Privacy Is Protected 
Morry S. Cole 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Morry S. Cole, Medical Malpractice Claim--Plaintiff's Privacy Is Protected, 62 MO. L. REV. (1997) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Medical Malpractice Claim? Plaintiff's
Privacy is Protected
State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd'
I. INTRODUCTION
Under Missouri law, a plaintiff who asserts a personal injury, workers'
compensation or other claim based on a medical condition waives the
physician-patient testimony privilege2 to the extent that past medical records
are relevant to the asserted injury in time or scope? This Note will examine
the development of this exception to Missouri's statutory physician-patient
testimonial privilege in the context of State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd,4 the
recent Missouri Supreme Court case that reaffirmed the requirement that
discovery of a plaintiffs past medical history may not be overly expansive.5
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Relator James Stecher sought a writ of prohibition limiting discovery of
his medical records by the defense in a medical malpractice action.6 Stecher
contended that his doctors administered an experimental drug without securing
Stecher's informed consent.! As a result of receiving the experimental drug,
Stecher alleged that he suffered a severe allergic reaction and that he will
continue to suffer adverse side effects.8
1. 912 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1995).
2. Missouri's physician-patienttestimonial privilege is codified inMo. REv. STAT.
§ 491.060(5) (1994). Id at 464. Under the statute, all information which a doctor
acquires while attending a patient that is necessary to provide treatment is privileged.
Id.
3. Id.; Brandt v. Medical Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Mo. 1993);
State ex reL McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. 1968).
4. 912 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1995).
5. The writ of prohibition issued by the Missouri Supreme Court in this case
covered both medical and employment records. For purposes of this Note, analysis
and discussion will be limited to the discoverability of medical records.
6. Stecher, 912 S.W.2d at 463.
7. Id.
8. Stecher alleged that he suffered severe side effects from the use of the
experimental drug Chimeric 7E3 Fab (C7E3 Fab). The side effects alleged include:
cardiogenic shock and vascular collapse, due to anaphylaxis (severe allergic
reaction), and . . . will suffer severe pain of body and mind, including
extensive bleeding. . . scars, an extensive amount of additional
hospitalization, and a propensity to any future reaction of any medication
1
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During discovery, defendants sought Stecher's signature on authorizations
for the release of his medical records.9 Stecher refused, claiming that they
were too broad.'0 Defendants moved for an order compelling disclosure
from Respondent, Honorable James R. Dowd." The order was granted as
to the medical records.' In addition, Dowd ordered Stecher to sign
authorizations that would direct employers to appear with employment records
for in camera inspection, in the presence of plaintiffs and defendant's
counsel. 3
or substance containing mouse antibodies...
Id Further, Stecher alleged that he was at risk of:
development of antibodies against C7E3 Fab, which antibodies may cause
severe allergic reactions, including breathing difficulty, lowering of blood
pressure, skin rash, temporary fever and chills, rapid heart rate, or a decrese
[sic] in platelet counts and bleeding, "Flushing" and moderate increases
inheart [sic] rate, or allergic reaction to any medication from mouse
antibodies at anytime in the future, as well as the drug's cancer-causing
potential or effects on fertility; in addition . . . an increased risk of
hemorrhage in the event of surgery, which might require additional
transfusions, and possible physical risks associated with blood transfusion
which include an allergic reaction, fever, immune system reaction, or
infection, including HIV ... or hepatitis....
Id








You are hereby authorized to permit the law firm of BROWN & JAMES,
P.C., or their agent, to examine and/or copy all hospital, medical and dental
records in your possession concerning my examination, treatment or
confinement, said medical records to include, but not limited to, x-rays, CT
scans, laboratory tests, nurses' notes, doctors' notes, consultations, admitting
and discharge summaries, and bills. A copy of this authorization shall be
sufficient to release medical records.
Id. at 463-64.
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Stecher sought a writ of prohibition against Dowd's orders from the
Eastern District Court of Appeals. 4  The petition was denied.' Upon
appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, a writ of prohibition was granted and
made absolute. 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At common law there was no physician-patient testimonial privilege.'
7
At trial, physicians were required to testify to privileged information, despite
their ethical obligation to respect a patient's privacy. 8 The physician-patient
testimonial privilege is solely a statutory creation, arising first in New York
in 1828,"9 and in Missouri in 1835.20 Missouri's statute-which is nearly
unchanged since it was first enacted-states in pertinent part:
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:
(5) A physician .... a licensed psychologist or a dentist .... concerning
any information which he may have acquired from any patient while
attending him in a professional character, and which information was
necessary to enable him to prescribe and provide treatment for such patient
as a physician, psychologist or dentist.2'
The statute speaks of persons "incompetent" to testify, and in early
interpretations of the statute this was read literally.' Under such a reading,
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Id. at 465.
17. See Blankenbaker v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 187 S.W. 840, 842 (Mo. 1916);
Epstein v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 S.W. 699, 705 (Mo. 1913); Klinge v. Lutheran
Med. Ctr. of St. Louis, 518 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). See also Daniel
W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret,
39 Sw. L.J. 661, 676-77 (1985); 18 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380(a)
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98 (4th
ed. 1992).
18. Thomas E. Toney, Waiver of the Physician-Patient Testimonial Privilege in
Missouri, 34 Mo. L. REV. 397 (1969) (citing Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 Howell
St. Tr. 355 (H.L. 1776)).
19. Id. (citing N.Y. REV. ST. 1828, II 406 (Part III c. VII, art. 9, § 73) (1828)).
20. 1835 Mo. Laws 623 § 17. Missouri was the second American jurisdiction to
enact a statutory physician-patient privilege. Toney, supra note 18, at 407.
21. MO. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1994).
22. See, e.g., Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93 (1874).
1997]
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no attending physician could testify for a plaintiff that asserted personal injury
because the physician was incompetent per se. 3
In more recent opinions such a literal reading has been abandoned.24
The Missouri Supreme Court realized that the statute was for the benefit of the
patient and therefore the patient could waive his statutory right.' Several
acts have been deemed to constitute waiver.26
Missouri's courts have found express waivers by explicit written
authorization27 or in a contract provision.28 Courts have also enforced
several waivers as waivers per se, which are statutory waivers codified to
effectuate a policy goal.29 And courts have recognized an implied waiver in
cases where a patient testifies as to treatment or the patient calls a doctor as
a witness and that doctor testifies as to treatment." In addition, there is a
recognized exception relevant to the facts of Stecher, which was first adopted
by the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet.3'
In McNutt, the court held "that once the matter of plaintiffs physical
condition is in issue under the pleadings, plaintiff will be considered to have
waived the privilege under [Mo. Rev. Stat.] § 491.060(5) so far as information
from doctors or medical and hospital records bearing on that issue is
concerned."3 2  However, "[t]he waiver . . . does not mean that it
automatically extends to every doctor or hospital record a party has had from
23. State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo. 1968).
24. See State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd, 912 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1995); Brandt v.
Pelican, 856 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1993); State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389,
392-93 (Mo. 1989); State exrel. McNuttv. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968); Epstein
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 S.W. 699 (Mo. 1913); Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249, 253-
56 (Mo. 1884); State ex rel. Degraffenreid v. Keet, 619 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
25. See supra note 24.
26. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. The four classifications of
waivers are taken from Toney, supra note 18, at 399-404.
27. See Davenport v. City of Hannibal, 18 S.W. 1122, 1123 (Mo. 1892).
28. See Russell v. Missouri Ins. Co., 232 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950);
Keller v. Home Life Ins. Co., 69 S.W. 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902).
29. See, e.g., Mo. RFv. STAT. § 210.140 (1994). Under this statute a doctor may
testify as to his beliefs about the cause of a child's injuries when abuse is suspected.
30. See Demonbrun v. McHaffie, 156 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Mo. 1941); Wells v. City
of Jefferson, 132 S.W.2d 1,006, 1010 (Mo. 1939); Epstein v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156
S.W. 699 (Mo. 1913); Cramer v. Hurt, 55 S.W. 258, 260 (Mo. 1900).
31. 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. 1968). Prior to the McNutt decision courts in
Missouri held that mere filing of a personal injury suit was not synonymous with an
implied waiver. See Smart v. Kansas City, 105 S.W. 709, 714-15 (Mo. 1907).
32. McNutt, 432 S.W.2d at 601.
(Vol. 62
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birth regardless of the bearing or lack of bearing . . . on the matters in
issue."33 Despite the clarity of the court's holding in McNutt, the proper
scope of medical authorizations in discovery proceedings came into issue
many times, on an appellate level, over the next twenty-six years. 4 Even
though the Missouri Supreme Court has followed the rule outlined in
McNuttf--as have Missouri's Courts of Appeal36-- when James Stecher
sued St. Louis University and two doctors practicing at St. Louis University
Medical Center the issue once again made its way to Missouri's high court in
State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Stecher v. Dowd, the Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed Missouri's
rule that, in a personal injury action, defendants are "not entitled to any and
all medical records, but only those medical records that relate to the physical
conditions at issue under the pleadings."37
The opinion began by outlining the basic stance of the relator, James
Stecher.38  As Judge Limbaugh explained, Stecher maintained that
defendant's requests for medical records were too broad, the requests would
permit discovery of irrelevant information and that the Honorable James R.
Dowd abused his discretion by ordering execution of the over-broad
authorizations.39 Next, the opinion gave a brief recitation of Stecher's
33. Id at 602.
34. See Brandt v. Pelican, 856 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Mo. 1993); State ex rel. Woytus
v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Mo. 1989); State ex rel. Tally v. Grimm, 722 S.W.2d
604 (Mo. 1987); State ex rel. Curtis v. Crow, 580 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Mo. 1979); State
ex rel. Dixon Oaks Health Ctr., Inc. v. Long, 929 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996); State ex rel. Griffin v. Weiberg, 838 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
Delaporte v. Robey Bldg. Supply, Inc. 812 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Baker
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 806 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991);
McClelland v. Ozenberger, 805 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Hayter v.
Griffen, 785 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Stuffelbaum v. Applequist, 694
S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Mo. Ct. App 1985); Gozenbach v. Eberwein, 655 S.W.2d 794,
796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. Degraffenreid v. Keet, 619 S.W.2d 873, 877-78
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Husgen v. Stussie, 617 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
L.S. v. L.M.S., 538 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Klinge v. Lutheran Med.
Ctr. of St. Louis, 518 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Hammack v. White, 464
S.W.2d 520, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
35. See supra note 34.
36. See supra note 34.
37. Stecher, 912 S.W.2d at 464.
38. Id. at 463-64.
39. Id. Relator also took issue with Judge Dowd's order allowing defendants'
1997]
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pleadings,4" and published the format of the defense medical authorization
form.4' The court then eiplained that since Stecher claimed to have "lost
wages in his answers to defendant's interrogatories, defendants requested that
he sign authorizations regarding his employment records."42
The opinion recounted that Stecher, objecting to Judge Dowd's rulings,
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Eastern District Court of
Appeals.43 The petition was denied." Next, the opinion provided analysis
of the crux of the case: the "determination of the proper scope of medical
authorizations in discovery proceedings."45
It was observed that the general rule of discovery, Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 56.01(b)(1), is that "parties may obtain information regarding any
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action so long as
the matter is not privileged."46 Further, relevance is broadly interpreted to
cover "material 'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."' 47 Since medical records are protected by the physician-patient
testimonial privilege codified in Missouri Revised Statute § 491.060(5)
(1994)-absent a waiver-the Court applied Missouri's "waiver by the
plaintiff bringing suit" exception.48 By so doing, the court reaffirmed the
rule first stated in State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, "that once plaintiffs put the
matter of their physical condition in issue under the pleadings, they waive the
physician-patient privilege insofar as information from doctors or medical and
hospital records bears on that issue."49
The Court then emphasized that "defendants are not entitled to any and
all medical records, but only those medical records that relate to the physical
conditions at issue under the pleadings."50 The Court also observed that this
can only be done by following a case-by-case standard.5'
counsel to be present during an in camera inspection of Stecher's employment records.
However, discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
40. See supra note 8 for relevant text of Stecher's pleadings.
41. See supra note 9 for format of the defense authorization.
42. Stecher, 912 S.W.2d at 464. The issue of discoverability of employment
records is beyond the scope of this Note.
43. Stecher, 912 S.W.2d at 464.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56.01(b)(1)).
47. Id.
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Although Stecher maintained that the only injury alleged was to his heart,
the Court found that his allegations set no "precise limits on his physical
complaints." 2  However, despite the encompassing nature of Stecher's
complaint, the defense medical authorizations had "absolutely no limits at
all."53 Therefore, citing McNutt, the Court explained, "the waiver.., does
not mean that it automatically extends to every doctor or hospital record a
party has had from birth regardless of the bearing or lack of bearing, as may
be, on the matters in issue.""4 Since there was no limiting language in the
defense's medical authorizations-and the limiting language contained in the
defense's interrogatories did not limit the scope of the medical
authorizations-the Court held that such authorizations "creates too great a
risk that non-relevant and privileged information may be released to the
defendants. 5
The Court further observed, "[p]rohibition is the proper remedy when a
trial court issues an order in discovery proceedings that is an abuse of
discretion."'56 Because the defense's medical authorizations were "overly
broad and unlimited in scope,"5' the Court held that Judge Dowd abused his
discretion in ordering Stecher to sign them and the preliminary writ of
prohibition was made absolute. 8
The remainder of the opinion held that defense counsel could not be
present during an in camera inspection of Stecher's employment records.5 9
All concurred. 6'
V. COMMENT
In Stecher, the Missouri Supreme Court reasserted the exception to the
physician-patient testimonial privilege first adopted in Missouri in State ex rel.
McNutt v. Keet.6' The well-established exception that a plaintiff
asserting a personal injury claim waives the physician-patient privilege only
to the extent that past medical records "reasonably relate to the injuries and
52. Id.
53. Id at 465.
54. Id. at 464 (citing State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Mo.
1968)).
55. Id
56. Id. (citing State ex rel. Plank v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 926, 927-28 (Mo. 1992)).




61. 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968).
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aggravations claimed by the plaintiffs in the present suit"6 was adopted to
promote fairness, efficiency, and to protect a patient's (plaintiffs) privacy.63
The fairness and efficiency arguments for the exception to physician-
patient privilege are clear for courts, plaintiffs and defendants. If properly
administered, the exception focuses medical malpractice litigation on the
relevant facts. For courts, this means easier identification of frivolous suits
and shorter trials. For plaintiffs, the exception promotes easier prosecution of
valid malpractice claims by reducing the effort and expense required to
develop the case. For defendants, the exception reduces the time and expense
required to present an effective defense.
The argument for a statutory physician-patient privilege to protect a
patient's (plaintiffs) privacy has been asserted since the rule's adoption.' 4
It has long been believed that enactment of a physician-patient privilege-one
that effectively protected the privacy of any disclosures between doctor and
patient-would encourage patients to more fully disclose any ailments from
which they are suffering, thereby facilitating better treatment.65 As this was
largely the reason underlying the enactment of the privilege, 6 any judicial
abrogation of the rule would, theoretically, reduce the quality of health care.
The privilege ensures that any information not pertinent to issues at bar will
remain undisclosed to the public, thereby protecting a plaintiff from the
chance of embarrassment, or harassment by the defense.67 While some
commentators question the effectiveness of physician-patient privilege
statutes,68 it is easy to see that a statute which allows recovery in tort for
breach is more imposing to physicians than an ethical obligation alone.
Arguably, on the facts in Stecher, Judge Dowd was within his discretion
in compelling disclosure. As respondent briefed, the defendants should not be
barred from discovery which may lead to admissible evidence, particularly
when alleged injuries are systemic in nature.69  Given the complexity of
Stecher's claimed injuries-and the complexity of the tests performed
throughout Stecher's treatment-it may well be that nearly all of Stecher's
62. Stecher, 912 S.W.2d at 464 (quoting McNutt, 432 S.W.2d at 602). See also
Brandt v. Medical Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Mo. 1993); State ex rel.
McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. 1968).
63. See Hartley v. Calbreath, 106 S.W. 570, 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
64. Id.
65. See generally Toney, supra note 18, at 407.
66. Id. For the counterargument see also Toney, supra note 18, at 407.
67. See Hartley, 106 S.W. at 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
68. See Toney, supra note 18, at 407.
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past medical history is relevant, if not in time at least in scope.70
Additionally, respondent argued that the Stecher was using the physician-
patient privilege as a shield and a sword, using the "privilege strategically to
exclude unfavorable evidence while at the same time admitting favorable
evidence."' However, these points pale in the light of the law as stated in
McNutt and Stecher.
McNutt v. Keet explicitly stated that "[t]he waiver. . . does not...
automatically [extend] to every doctor or hospital record a party has had from
birth ... ,72 The court in Stecher did not say that Stecher's past medical
records were not discoverable, it merely said that the form of the
authorizations was unacceptable. Simply interpreted, the court said that some
type of limiting language must exist in medical record authorizations.
Despite the clarity of the Stecher opinion, one vagary exists. The court
stated, "[i]t must be emphasized that under this rule, defendants are not
entitled to any and all medical records, but only those medical records that
relate to the physical conditions at issue under the pleadings" (emphasis
added).73 This statement of the rule begs the question: What effect does an
expansive response to an interrogatory have on a narrow pleading? Will a
plaintiff's expansive response to interrogatories open the gate to broad
discoverability of past medical records?
If so, allowing discovery of past medical records based on answers to
interrogatories will be, essentially, treating answers to interrogatories as quasi-
amendments to the formal pleadings. Thus, courts will not be following a
literal reading of the rule quoted from Stecher. Common sense dictates that
when a plaintiff answers an interrogatory with facts that could be relevant to
70. The Missouri Association of Defense Lawyers and Medical Defense
Associates, in an amicus brief filed in Stecher, observed that it would be ridiculous to
expect a judge or medical records custodian to understand the pertinence of:
"CRRR ... Dopamine Echo(D/Echo) ... ventriculogram ...
PTCA... emphysema.., diabetes... embolus ... MAP..
. Thallium stress test... RA ... LV ... angiogram ...
congenital injuries . . . ASHD... methoxamine hydrochloride
... trauma... shock... PCWP ... kidney problems ... pnea
... hypovolemia... ventricular septal defect ... severe mitral
regurgitation . . . discrete aneurysm . . . phenylephrine
hydrochloride . . . mental obtundation . . . peripheral
vasoconstriction . . . pulmonary congestion . . . urinary
output...
Amicus brief at 13, State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd, 912 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1995).
71. Respondent's brief at 22, State exrel. Stecherv. Dowd, 912 S.W.2d 462 (Mo.
1995).
72. State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Mo. 1968).
73. Stecher, 912 S.W.2d at 464.
1997]
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the proceedings those facts will no longer be protected by the physician-
patient privilege. Once waiver is found, it will be broadly interpreted.74
If not, then discovery will be limited to the facts in the pleadings. This
must certainly not be the result intended by the court.
In light of Stecher, there are measures that advocates for both plaintiffs
and defendants can take to strengthen their cases during pretrial preparation.
Plaintiffs can plead injury carefully and narrowly to avoid over-broad
discovery. Unfortunately, this may lead to abuse by plaintiffs-what the
Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers and Medical Defense Associates
points out is using the rule "to simultaneously serve as a 'shield' and a
'dagger'. 75 After carefully pleading, a plaintiff must be certain to carefully
answer interrogatories to avoid unintentionally waiving the privilege further.
Defense attorneys can continue to draft extremely broad interrogatories
and medical record release authorizations-with only loose language limiting
time and scope-in the hope of uncovering past records which weaken or
eliminate the plaintiffs case. Perhaps such broad documents are, as
respondent briefed,76 commonplace. Regardless, if such releases are signed,
the defense has access to potentially relevant history, particularly in cases
involving systemic injuries.
Relator suggested that the Court should adopt their authorization form as
a standard form for use in medical malpractice actions.77 However, as Judge
Limbaugh explained, "medical authorizatiorns must be tailored to the pleadings,
and this can only be achieved on a case-by-case basis."78 When considering
the myriad of potential medical malpractice claims, one realizes that a standard
authorization form would be nearly impossible to draft. When the law is
clearly stated, as in McNutt and Stecher, a case-by-case standard should yield
little abuse by trial judges.
74. Toney, supra note 18, at 406 (citing William R. Peterson, The Patient-
Physician Privilege in Missouri, 20 UMKC L. REV. 122, 133 (1952)).
75. Amicus brief at 19, State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd, 912 S.W.2d 462 (Mo.
1995) (citing Brandt v. Medical Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667, 672 (Mo. 1993));
State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1968); Thomas N. Sterchi &
Edward H. Sheppard, Defendant's Right to Secure Medical Information and Records
ConcerningPlaintiff, 53 UMKC L. REv. 46, 47-48 (1984)).
76. Brief for Respondent at 16, State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd, 912 S.W.2d 462
(Mo. 1995).
77. Id. at 19-21.
78. Stecher, 912 S.W.2d at 464.
[Vol. 62
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VI. CONCLUSION
State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd stands for stability in medical malpractice
discovery. The Missouri Supreme Court strongly restated the exception to the
physician-patient testimonial privilege first adopted in State ex rel. McNutt v.
Keet. By so doing, the Court ensured that discovery of past medical records
will not become an unbridled area of discretion for trial judges and furthered
the worthy goals of avoiding undue delay, providing certainty to the scope of
discovery and protecting a patient's privacy, while facilitating prosecution of
valid medical malpractice actions.
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